Culture, Subject, and Psyche: Dialogues in Psychoanalysis and Anthropology.  Anthony Molino, ed.  Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2004. xv + 217 pp.

Reviewed by: Sara E. Lewis, MA, Master’s Candidate, School of Social Service Administration, University of Chicago

Psychoanalysis is taken by some anthropologists to be a modernist project, and one that seeks to universalize and ultimately pathologize elements of the human experience.  Indeed, most anthropological critiques of psychoanalysis tend to refer only to Freud and early ethnographers who engage with the Oedipus Complex, or a classical drive psychology model.  And yet, as demonstrated in Culture, Subject, Psyche, today’s psychoanalytically-informed anthropology looks quite different.  And why shouldn’t it be?  A critique of anthropology, as a discipline, based only on the works of Malinowski, Frazer, or others from a century ago would be not taken seriously by most anthropologists.  Likewise, critiques of psychoanalysis and its relevance and applicability to anthropology that look only to Freud hold little merit.

Anthony Molino, an anthropologist and psychoanalyst, compiled a series of transcribed conversations he had with 7 notable thinkers in anthropology and psychoanalysis.  There is a prologue by Wesley Shumar on the history of anthropology and psychoanalysis, and Molino offers a compelling introduction to relations between the two disciplines.  Waud Kracke and Lucia Villela, in the Afterword, write short essays on ways in which anthropology and psychoanalysis have come together in the literature as well as review the interviews in the text.  Molino does not offer a specific thesis, but rather presents the pluralistic perspectives of integral thinkers in their own voices to render the complex issues that mark debates in psychoanalytic anthropology.  

One such is controversy is the question of how to conceptualize the “unconscious,” which is clearly a central point of interest for psychoanalytic thinkers.  Michael Rustin maintains that the clinical consulting room is a unique context in which the trained analyst can discern unconscious phenomena from more surface (conscious) material.  He is skeptical that anthropologists have the necessary training to work with the unconscious material of their informants in the field, and furthermore, is not convinced the unconscious is easily discernable outside an analysis.  Both Molino and Kracke take issue with Rustin’s assertion that the clinical setting is so radically different from other settings, including ethnographic fieldwork.

Although Katherine Ewing trained at a psychoanalytic institute, her perspective on the “unconscious” is markedly different from Rustin’s.  She rejects the notion that the unconscious  is only observable in the clinical consulting room and is suspicious of the use of the term to refer to a structural aspect of mind with an inherent causal function.  Ewing considers quite deeply the unexpressed desires and motivations of her informants yet prefers “the implicit” or “something not articulated verbally” to “the unconscious.”

Molino, Kracke, Obeyesekere, Crapanzano, Ewing, and others in the book contend that psychoanalysis can aid significantly in one’s reflection of his or her own position in the field.  The terms “transference” and “countertransference” tend to be misunderstood by critics of psychoanalysis.  Unlike Freud in his early work where he saw countertransference as the analyst’s own unresolved issues projected onto the patient and a hindrance to treatment, contemporary psychoanalytic thinkers argue that countertransference reactions can provide clues to patients’ inner states that may not be expressed explicitly in verbal communication. 

Ewing argues that so-called reflexive anthropology is limited in its scope without an appreciation of transference and countertransference.  She uses seamlessly psychoanalytic concepts in her discussion yet seems unrestrained by the sometimes rigid concepts and jargon of the discipline.  For example, she argues it is not necessary to use the term “transference,” but rather one can notice how informants build “a structure of feelings and assumptions about who I am that are not based on direct observation” (p. 94).  Ewing, in a general way, paints a cohesive and convincing picture of psychoanalytically-informed anthropology. 

Gananath Obeyesekere and Vincent Crapazano have also made tremendous contributions to the evolution of psychoanalytically-informed anthropology, particularly in their challenge to  positivist psychoanalytic theories (for example, Kardiner) used in anthropology some thirty years ago (p. 49).  Obeyesekere maintains, for example, that it generally makes little sense to consider ego psychologies outside of Western contexts, particularly among groups with more sociocentric concepts of self.      

In his interview with Obeyesekere, Molino claims there is a major gap in the work of anthropologists interested in psychoanalysis, in that there is a “near-total lack of familiarity” with developments (in psychoanalysis) in the last twenty or thirty years (p. 59).  Molino asserts that anthropologists are especially uninformed in the British Independent tradition (Winnicott, Fairbairn, etc.).  Indeed, although the Independent school has become increasingly influential in other disciplines, it was mentioned only superficially by interviewees.  Members of the Independent school left Freud’s inner circle, and eventually Melanie Klein’s too, due to a strong commitment to a perspective where social and cultural life shapes individual experience in deep and integral ways.  Seeing that Winnicott and others construct a socially and culturally informed psychoanalysis, it is curious that anthropologists have not embraced this tradition.  The work of Jacques Lacan, on the other hand, is represented marvelously among interviewees, creating a rich intersection with critical theories also used frequently by these scholars. 

Kathleen Stewart was conscientious in her use of the term “ethnography,” consistently situating her knowledge within the context of her own work, which is colorfully described.  Michael Rustin suggests during his interview that Molino uses the term “ethnography” too broadly.  Indeed, readers might be left wondering how psychoanalysis can help one to understand Mexican immigrants’ sense of identity, or Fijian political revolution as well as the emotional states of psychotic patients in London.  It remains rather unclear if Molino or the interviewees argue that psychoanalysis can inform content that is not necessarily psychological.